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NSPG Meeting, 31 August 1984

Part 1: India-Pakistan

Part 2: NSDD 99 - US Security Strategy
for Near East and South Asia

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30 August 1984

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

FROM: SA/DCI/IA

SUBJECT: NSPG Meeting on India-Pakistan/NSDD 99, 31 August 1984

1. You are scheduled to attend an NSPG meeting on Friday, 31 August at 11:00. The President will chair this meeting. Bob Gates will accompany you.

2. The NSC apparently intends to structure this meeting into two half-hour sessions. In the first you will take up the subject of Pakistan. In the second you will take up in general terms U.S. policy towards Southwest Asia.

3. The NSC has indicated that you will be expected to make two 5-minute presentations -- one in each half-hour. In the first you will cover the question of threats to Pakistan; in particular, the Soviet threat and; secondly, the possibility of Indian pressures, e.g. cross border incursions and the possibility of a strike against the Pakistani nuclear facilities. In your 5-minute presentation in the second half-hour you will be asked to address the question of Soviet designs on Southwest Asia. In particular they have asked that you discuss Soviet military capabilities opposite the region and what Soviet exercises tell us about their intentions.

4. The topics for this session have changed a number of times this week. My understanding is that there were those who wished to focus solely on Pakistan and indeed an inter-agency paper has been in preparation on that subject. Part of the reason that there has been so much confusion about this meeting stems from the fact that there are differences of view with respect to how urgent the Pakistani problem is and; secondly, the State paper that was to inform the subject of the meeting is apparently not every good. As I understand it, the NSC/McFarlane believes that the Soviet/Indian threat to Pakistan is severe and that the U.S. must act in a comprehensive manner to:

- reassure Pakistan with new arms commitments,
- apply pressure to put the nuclear problem under control,

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
Proposed Talking Points
NSPG Meeting 31 August 1984 on Pakistan

THE THREAT TO PAKISTAN

The Soviets are now mounting a direct, if limited, military and political threat to Zia. The Soviet or Afghan cross-border air attacks in Pakistan on 13, 14, and 23 August and artillery strikes on 18, 19, and 21 August resulted in 54 killed and 33 wounded.

The attacks probably were made in the context of Soviet and Afghan military operations close to the border in Afghanistan's Paktia Province, but also probably were intended as a warning to Islamabad to end its support for the Afghan resistance.

Soviet political pressure on Pakistan has also increased recently.




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The frequency of the cross border attacks suggests cross-border strikes are likely to be a steady form of pressure.

- The attacks probably will remain brief and confined to the frontier regions.
- The Soviets do not now have in Afghanistan the forces or logistics necessary to mount large-scale cross-border operations against Pakistan.

Soviet operations in Afghanistan have not been sufficiently successful to allow them to contemplate extended operations beyond that country. Their forces in Afghanistan are tied down, and their supply lines and many installations remain vulnerable to insurgent attacks. In addition, the Soviets so far have not made the logistic and other infrastructure improvements that would be required to turn Afghanistan into a forward base for major operations elsewhere in the region. Soviet command post exercises since 1980 have portrayed operations against Pakistan, but in the context of a general war.

Soviet forces potentially available for use in an Afghan-Pakistan operation include:



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- The Chinese angle requires examination. The close Chinese-Pakistan relationship, which in China's view contributes to keeping the Soviets and Indians at bay, would draw China into a cautious but active role in the event of hostilities between India and Pakistan. Apart from providing propaganda and moral support, China would most likely replace lost Pakistani war materiel and under some circumstances, could attempt to divert Indian attention by beefing up its garrisons or even making shallow raids in disputed areas along the Chinese-Indian border.
- Beijing probably views its stakes in Pakistan as being at least as high as Washington's, for persistent weakness of the Zia government would improve Soviet and Indian opportunities to pressure China from the south, thus completing the arc of hostile powers that runs from IndoChina through India and Afghanistan to the Soviet Union. In these circumstances, China would listen to US proposals and, where possible, implement parallel policies. But China would not act in concert or in tandem with the US for fear of compromising its so-called independent foreign policy.
- In our view, China has aided Pakistan's nuclear program over the years in response to Pakistani fears that began with India's explosion of a nuclear device in 1974.

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[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] We doubt that China would be willing to key additional high-level assurances or reduce participation to Pakistan's current difficulties, since this would amount to deserting an ally at a critical moment. On the other hand, the Chinese might be willing to join--or at least support behind the scenes--an agreement under which both India and Pakistan disavowed the production and use of nuclear weapons against each other.

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Afghanistan-Pakistan: Cross-Border Incidents

Notes for the DCI

Prepared by the Office of Near Eastern and South Asian Analysis
29 August 1984

1. The Soviet or Afghan cross-border air attacks in the Parachinar area of Pakistan on 13, 14, and 23 August and artillery strikes on 18, 19, and 21 August resulted in 54 killed and 33 wounded.

2. The attacks probably were made in the context of Soviet and Afghan military operations close to the border in Afghanistan's Paktia Province, but also probably were intended as a warning to Islamabad to end its support for the Afghan resistance:

- Resistance pressure on Afghan towns and Army garrisons has been particularly strong in Paktia Province, and has increased since July.
- The Parachinar area of Pakistan is a major area for insurgent infiltration into Afghanistan, and a likely target for Soviet attacks aimed at interdicting resistance supply lines.
- Pakistani officials believe the attacks were a deliberate attempt to pressure Islamabad before the UN-sponsored indirect talks on Afghanistan reconvened in Geneva, particularly after Moscow's demarche in July that warned of severe "consequences" if Islamabad did not change its policy.
- No cross-border attacks have occurred since the Geneva talks resumed on 24 August.

3. The frequency of the attacks suggests that the Soviets no longer regard Pakistan's border as inviolate in their operations in Afghanistan, and more cross-border strikes are likely:

- The attacks probably will remain brief and confined to the frontier regions.
- The Soviets do not now have in Afghanistan the forces or logistics necessary to mount large-scale cross-border operations against Pakistan.

4. The attacks could escalate in size and intensity if the Soviets believe Zia is indecisive or domestically weakened, US-Pakistan relations are strained, or Islamabad is preoccupied with the threat from India.

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Background and Status of NSDD-99

NSDD-99 was completed in July 1983. Its major features include:

- revalidation of previous decisions citing the major US strategic interests in the region as blocking Soviet influence and maintaining access to oil;
- a decision to develop a US capability to mount a sustained defense of the region as far forward as possible.

To achieve the latter, the NSDD calls for closer military relations with Israel as well as moderate Arabs, Turkey, Pakistan and India. It also calls for discussion with our European allies and Japan on sharing the defense burden in the area. The major responsibility for implementing these rests with State and DOD.

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

July 12, 1983

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE HONORABLE GEORGE BUSH
The Vice President

THE HONORABLE GEORGE P. SHULTZ
The Secretary of State

THE HONORABLE DONALD T. REGAN
The Secretary of the Treasury

THE HONORABLE CASPAR W. WEINBERGER
The Secretary of Defense

THE HONORABLE DONALD P. HODEL
The Secretary of Energy

THE HONORABLE WILLIAM J. CASEY
The Director of Central Intelligence

THE HONORABLE JEANE J. KIRKPATRICK
The United States Representative to the
United Nations

GENERAL JOHN W. VESSEY, JR.
The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff

SUBJECT: National Security Decision Directive on
United States Security Strategy for the Near East
and South Asia (S)

Attached is the Decision Directive pursuant to yesterday's National
Security Council meeting. (U)


William P. Clark

Attachment
NSDD-99

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THE WHITE HOUSE

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WASHINGTON

July 12, 1983

National Security Decision
Directive Number 99United States Security Strategy for
the Near East and South Asia (S)

The recent National Security Study, NSSD-4/82, reaffirmed the basic soundness of the purposes and objectives of our National Security Policy toward the Near East and South Asia. The derivative and complementary regional security interests, objectives and strategy outlined in NSSD-4 are approved and restated herewith: (U)

U.S. Regional Interests

-- to prevent the Soviet Union from attaining a position of hegemony in the region by deterring Soviet expansion and by supporting the sovereignty of all countries in the region. (S)

-- to maintain continued access for the US and its principal allies to Gulf oil. (TS)

U.S. Regional Security Objectives

-- to deter Soviet aggression and maintain readiness for combat if necessary. (S)

-- to counter and reverse Soviet efforts to extend influence by other means. (TS)

-- to protect US and Western access to adequate supplies of oil. (S)

-- to ensure the security of Israel within secure and internationally recognized borders. (S)

-- to obtain a comprehensive lasting peace between Israel and her Arab neighbors and the resolution of the Palestinian problem based upon the principles outlined by the President on September 1, 1982. (U)

-- to help resolve other regional conflicts that threaten our interests. (U)

-- to strengthen regional stability by measures to improve economic conditions and indigenous defense capabilities. (U)

-- to expand US influence with selected states in the region. (S)

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-- to limit the ability of unfriendly or hostile regimes to destabilize or subvert selected friendly countries in the region.

-- to discourage proliferation of nuclear explosive capabilities in the region. (S)

Threats to U.S. Interests and Objectives

The most serious threats to our vital interests and objectives in the region are the power, influence, and activity of the Soviet Union. The geographic proximity of the USSR, and its determination to interfere, directly and indirectly, with the internal complexion and external alignment of countries which border it compound the threats. In this regard, the improvements in the regular military forces of the Soviet Union poised for use in the region and the enhanced power projection capabilities available for use in the Near East and South Asia, pose a formidable challenge. In addition, the inimical regional policies and activities of governments, such as the fundamentalist regime in Iran, pose a clear challenge to the moderate oil producing countries. Finally, our vital interests could be directly threatened by internal unrest and upheaval in the moderate Arab countries. (S)

Intra-regional conflicts, such as the Iraq-Iran war and the Arab-Israel conflict pose serious threats to our vital interests. Other potential regional conflicts which would pose grave danger to US interests include another Indo-Pakistani war and renewed fighting between the PDRY on the one hand and either Oman or the YAR on the other. These conflicts threaten our interests by creating potential superpower confrontations, opportunities for the expansion of Soviet influence in the region, the spread of violence and instability, and the estrangement of key regional states. The continuing Soviet presence in Ethiopia and the PDRY poses threats to our vital LOCs and the projection of US forces into the area. Moreover, Soviet and Cuban support of local conflicts and insurgencies further destabilize the region. (S)

Strategic Planning for the Near East and South Asia

The foregoing validation of our national security interests and objectives in the region provides the basis for refining and revising our regional strategy, as necessary. To advance US interests requires a comprehensive political-military strategy which is premised on mutually reinforcing diplomatic, economic and security initiatives. This strategy must develop and exploit opportunities to strengthen the US strategic posture in the Near East and South Asia and weaken Soviet influence, while enhancing the perception of key regional states that cooperation with the US serves their national interests. In keeping with our core interests, we are committed to acquiring the capabilities to mount a sustained defense of the region as far forward as possible, including Iran as appropriate. Our strategy is to

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include balanced use of the three key US assets as perceived in the region: (S)

-- the US ability to deter and counter Soviet aggression; (S)

-- the unique capability among outside powers to take a leading role in resolving the Arab-Israeli conflict; (S)

-- the technological, industrial, economic and military strength which the US can bring to bear to assist other countries. (U)

Strategic Concept for Near-Term Planning

Beyond the defense of NATO's southern flank, the Eastern Mediterranean and its littoral, our near term military strategy and the derivative concept and operations plans for the Near East and South Asia should focus on defending the oil fields, the transshipment points and the sea and air lines of communication to this theater. Our plans should, in any case, allow us to prevent control of these vital resources by the Soviet Union. Plans should be based on prudent assumptions regarding the active cooperation of countries in the region, and those outside the region that might provide enroute support. Until we have procured the requisite strategic mobility, supporting force structure and we have assured access to the base facilities necessary to undertake a robust forward defense of the Gulf region, our plans should be based on the existing and programmed capabilities of our forces and those of our friends and allies which are not forces "assigned" to NATO or their essential support. Together with others, we must be ready to move military assets forward first, to deter Soviet aggression on receipt of strategic warning, and secondly, to interdict the movement of Soviet combat forces to the Gulf region. I also want to reaffirm this Administration's determination to block any military moves by the Soviets, their surrogates or any other powers which threaten US and allied access to the critical resources of the region. (TS)

Cooperation with Other Countries

Because our vital interests in this part of the world are essentially shared interests, we must redouble our efforts to obtain the cooperation of our allies and other friendly powers in bringing stability to the region, deterring threats to vital Western interests and, in the final analysis, defending those interests. In addition, mindful of the need for cooperation in the security of energy, the U.S. remains committed to the goals of the International Energy Agency and other commitments enumerated in NSSD 9-82 and NSDD-87. (TS)

-- NATO Allies and Japan. To demonstrate our solidarity and enhance deterrence we should seek assistance in the form of

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direct military contributions from our principal NATO allies with highly mobile and specialized military capabilities suitable to a variety of NE/SA scenarios, especially the UK and France. With regard to the potential contributions of the UK and France, we should be prepared to assist, as necessary, in the movement of their specialized forces to the region. In keeping with ongoing negotiations, our principal allies and the FRG and Japan, in particular, should be asked to contribute by assisting in the improvement of infrastructure which would facilitate defense of the oil fields and the critical transshipment points. They should also be encouraged to increase security and economic assistance to poor but important countries such as Turkey, Sudan, Egypt and Pakistan. (TS)

-- Cooperation with Turkey. Because Turkey occupies a strategic position adjacent to Soviet invasion routes, our cooperation in contingency planning beyond the traditional NATO missions is of fundamental importance. To enhance Turkish confidence; promote the cooperation we seek; and, equally important, to help Turkey realize its military potential, we need a strategy for securing new and more meaningful increases in defense funding for Turkey. This may entail, inter alia, a serious effort to obtain help from allies and the Gulf States and imaginative steps to resolve the Cyprus and Aegean problems which impede allied cooperation and frustrate Congressional funding. Steps must be taken to develop immediate plans for exercising US and allied forces in Eastern Turkey on a more regular basis. To overcome concerns within NATO about activities beyond the treaty area, we need to make a strong case in NATO that the improvements we seek in Eastern Turkey are required in any event to cope with a Soviet attack in that area. Our efforts to upgrade co-located operating bases should be strengthened, and we should continue to explore other measures which would enhance the responsiveness of our forces. (TS)

-- Cooperation with Israel. I acknowledge that our ability to defend vital interests in the Near East and South Asia would be enhanced by the resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict. Nevertheless, in recognition of Israel's strategic location, developed base infrastructure, and the quality and interoperability of Israeli military forces, we will undertake to resume cooperative planning with Israel expanding on the work begun earlier. To this end, we should conduct an internal review on where we could profit militarily from cooperative planning for major Soviet involvement and aggression which threaten vital western interests in the Near East and South Asia. The emphasis should be on Israeli contributions which could serve our military objectives in countering Soviet capabilities. This review should commence immediately and the recommendations of the Secretary of Defense should be submitted to me not later than August 30, 1983. Thereafter, we will develop an interagency plan to implement the findings of this review as feasible and appropriate. (TS)

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-- Cooperation with Arab Powers. Given the critical need for facilities access in the region and, in some instances, the potential of Arab military forces, we should continue and expand our cooperative planning with Saudi Arabia, Oman, Bahrain, Jordan, Egypt, Morocco and Sudan. We should also consider what potential role Lebanon might play in our strategy in the future. Improvements in our strategic position in the Horn of Africa should be sought. This could well require increased efforts to weaken Soviet positions in the PDRY and Ethiopia. (TS)

-- Cooperation with Pakistan. Our efforts to promote cooperation with Pakistan to meet Soviet contingencies in the region must be pressed, including plans for joint exercises and access to facilities, bearing in mind the political and military challenges Pakistan faces. The precedent established by the invasion and continued occupation of Afghanistan and the potential for future Soviet encroachments in areas such as Baluchistan should be discussed anew with the Pakistanis. Bearing in mind Pakistani sensitivities, our future efforts should reemphasize the value of prior contingency planning and a program for Security Assistance which is rationalized with our own capabilities. In this regard our plans should recognize the importance of Pakistan in the interdiction of Soviet LOCs to the Gulf and Arabian Sea. We must recognize the importance of, and be willing to help plan to meet, those contingencies which the Pakistanis find most threatening. We should also continue with determination and clarity of purpose to discourage the further development of Pakistan's nuclear weapons capabilities. (TS)

-- Cooperation with India. Consistent with our goals for cooperation with Pakistan we should adopt a diplomatic strategy which more explicitly recognizes India's strategic importance in both regional and global terms. This strategy should have as its initial objective, the improvement of relations between India, the PRC and Pakistan and the gradual weakening of India's military dependency on the Soviet Union. To this end we must continue our efforts to broaden our economic and military ties with India including closer liaison between our military establishments. We must continue our efforts to convince the Indian Government of the need to resist Soviet expansion and our determination to do so and to discourage regional disputes which can only redound to the advantage of the Soviet Union. (TS)


Implementation

I would like the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense to prepare a comprehensive agenda of the preferred ways to implement the military and diplomatic strategies outlined above. A comprehensive examination of requirements for contingencies in the region is needed to include prepositioning, communications, access to enroute and in-theater facilities as well as a detailed

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examination of the relationship between our own arms transfer policies and other Western arms sales. The work program should be developed and the reviews should be completed on a priority basis. The work program should be submitted to the NSC by 30 July and thereafter periodic reports should be submitted to me to describe progress and to discuss problems which may arise. (S)



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